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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is a securities class action lawsuit brought by 
shareholders of Advanta Corporation against the 
corporation and several of its officers. Plaintiffs allege the 
defendants made false and misleading statements and 
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material omissions regarding the company's earnings 
potential and value of its stock, in violation of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934. The District Court granted 
Advanta's motion to dismiss for failure to meet the pleading 
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4 




Plaintiffs are former shareholders of Advanta Corporation 
("Advanta"), a leading issuer of MasterCard and VISA credit 
cards. Advanta forged its reputation in the credit card 
industry by innovating the practice of attracting new 
customers with unusually low introductory interest rates, 
known as "teaser rates," which remain in effect for a limited 
period of time, often six months. At the end of this period, 
the interest rate returns to a higher, permanent level. 
During the early and mid-1990s, Advanta used this 
practice to achieve rapid growth and earn large profits. 
 
The focus of this litigation concerns a $20 millionfirst- 
quarter loss that Advanta announced on March 17, 1997. 
According to plaintiffs' complaint, the loss was caused by 
Advanta's decision to implement aggressive techniques to 
attract new credit card customers. Specifically, plaintiffs 
allege Advanta began issuing cards with lower teaser rates 
and longer introductory periods than standard industry 
practice, resulting in riskier customers and, ultimately, a 
decrease in revenues as many of the new customers 
defaulted on their repayment obligations. The increased 
delinquency rates produced greater "charge-offs," which are 
the costs incurred by the credit card company when a card 
holder's balance becomes uncollectible. 
 
Plaintiffs claim Advanta officers failed to disclose these 
practices despite knowledge of the risks involved, even after 
it became clear that losses were inevitable, and 
simultaneously made various statements that allegedly 
were false or materially misleading. Much of plaintiffs' 
complaint focuses on a statement made by Janet Point, 
Advanta's Vice President for Investor Relations, in a 
September 12, 1996 Dow Jones article. The article reads in 
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part, "Over the next six months Advanta will experience a 
large increase in revenues as it converts more than $5 
billion in accounts that are now at teaser rates of about 7% 
to its normal interest rate of about 17%, said Advanta 
spokeswoman Janet Point." This statement ("the Point 
statement") allegedly contradicts a subsequent statement 
by Dennis Alter, Advanta's chairman and former CEO ("the 
Alter statement"). In a June 1997 article entitled "House of 
Cards" that appeared in Philadelphia Magazine, Alter was 
quoted as saying: "[W]hat happened is when the 
introductory period ended, we were probably not as 
aggressive as we could have been [repricing our rates] . . . . 
Instead of repricing to 18 percent we repriced closer to 13 
or 14 percent in order to retain our image and the luster of 
being a low-cost provider." Plaintiffs allege the Alter 
statement proves the Point statement was false and 
misleading, because the Point statement appears to 
indicate that Advanta was planning to reprice its teaser 
rates to 17 percent, yet the Alter statement apparently 
reveals that Advanta repriced to only 13 or 14 percent. 
 
In addition, plaintiffs identify various statements 
portraying Advanta in what plaintiffs believe was an unduly 
positive light. These "positive portrayals" include the 
following statements, among others: 
 
(1) Advanta's 1996 third-quarter report states in part: 
"Our track record underscores our commitment to excel . . . 
[Advanta is] a rapidly growing customer financial services 
enterprise . . . . [D]espite challenging industry environment, 
we are pleased to report that Advanta produced continued, 
consistent earnings growth in the third quarter. . .. [F]or 
the fifth consecutive year, return on equity has met or 
exceeded the 25% level achieved this quarter." 
 
(2) In a Form 10-Q filed on November 12, 1996, Advanta 
stated: "The changes in the delinquency and charge-off 
rates from year-to-year . . . reflect the trend in unsecured 
credit quality which is being experienced throughout the 
credit industry." 
 
(3) Announcing a shareholder dividend on November 13, 
1996, Advanta released a statement reading in part,"[T]his 
dividend increase reflects management's confidence in the 
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company's earnings momentum and Advanta's continuing 
commitment to enhancing shareholder value." 
 
(4) On January 21, 1997, Advanta chairman Dennis Alter 
stated, "I am pleased to report that in 1996, Advanta 
maintained the growth of its current businesses and 
accelerated its expansion into new ventures." 
 
According to plaintiffs, these statements were made with 
knowledge that they were false and misleading, and 
plaintiffs relied on them in deciding to buy (or not to sell) 
Advanta stock. Consequently, the complaint alleges that the 
positive portrayals constitute a violation of section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") and 
Rule 10b-5. 
 
In addition, one of the plaintiffs, Jerry Weinberg, alleges 
that two of the individual defendants, Richard Greenawalt 
and Robert Marshall, traded large blocks of Advanta stock 
contemporaneously with Weinberg while in possession of 
material, nonpublic information, violating section 20(A) of 
the Exchange Act. According to the complaint, Greenawalt 
sold Class A and B stock on December 6, 1996; Marshall 
sold Class A and B stock on December 9, 1996; and 
Weinberg purchased Class A stock on December 9, 1996. 
The complaint does not allege that either defendant traded 
stock directly with Weinberg, only that the trading was 
sufficiently contemporaneous to warrant relief under 
section 20(A). 
 
On December 17, 1997, plaintiffs filed a complaint 
naming Advanta and seven of its present and former 
officers and directors as defendants. Count I of the 
complaint alleges the defendants are liable under Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. S 78j(b) (West Supp. 
1999), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. 
S 240.10b-5 (1998), for the Point statement and the positive 
portrayals. Count II, based on the same factual allegations, 
asserts the liability of the individual defendants under 
section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Count III asserts 
Weinberg's section 20(A) claim of contemporaneous trading 
against individual defendants Greenawalt and Marshall. 
 
The District Court granted defendants' motions to 
dismiss all three counts. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 
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No. 97-CV-4343, mem. op. at 23-24 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 1998). 
Specifically, the District Court held that Count I's claims 
based on the Point statement and the positive portrayals 
failed to meet the pleading requirements imposed by Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 9(b) and the Reform Act. The court dismissed 
these claims without prejudice and granted 30 days' leave 
for plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The court also 
dismissed without prejudice Counts II and III, holding that 
they were derivative of Count I.1 Rather than amend their 
complaint, plaintiffs elected to file a Notice of Intention to 
Stand on the Complaint, which the District Court 
construed as a request to dismiss the remaining claims 
with prejudice. See Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 
278 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[A] plaintiff can convert a dismissal 
with leave to amend into a final order by electing to stand 
upon the original complaint."). By an order entered 
September 18, 1998, the District Court denied plaintiffs' 




A. Applicable Pleading Requirements 
 
At the outset, we must determine the effect of the Reform 
Act on the pleading requirements governing securities fraud 
lawsuits, particularly with respect to pleading scienter. 
Plaintiffs argue the Reform Act codified the standard 
developed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 
(2d Cir. 1987) and subsequent cases, and adopted by this 
Court in In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 
1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997). Under the Second Circuit 
standard, a plaintiff must plead facts supporting a "strong 
inference" that the defendant acted with the requisite 
scienter, by alleging either "facts establishing a motive to 
commit fraud and an opportunity to do so" or"facts 
constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or 
conscious behavior." In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Count I also contained a claim based on statements regarding changes 
to Advanta's charge-off policy. The District Court dismissed the claim 
with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs do not appeal 
this 
part of the ruling. 
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F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993). Defendants argue the Reform 
Act establishes a pleading standard that is more stringent 
than all previously existing standards, including the Second 
Circuit's. 
 
To date, two federal courts of appeals have concluded 
without analysis that the Reform Act codified the Second 
Circuit standard. See Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 
166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999); Williams v. WMX 
Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997). Numerous 
district courts have considered the issue, with split results. 
A majority have held the Reform Act essentially codified the 
Second Circuit's approach.2 Others, including a district 
court of this circuit, have held the Act imposes an even 
more stringent pleading standard.3 The most notable case is 
In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 
(N.D. Cal. 1997), in which the court conducted a detailed 
examination of the legislative history and prior case law 
before concluding that allegations of "[m]otive, opportunity, 
and non-deliberate recklessness" are no longer"sufficient to 
support scienter unless the totality of the evidence creates 
a strong inference of fraud." See id. at 757. 
 
The Reform Act requires a plaintiff alleging a Rule 10b-5 
violation to 
 
       specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, 
       the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, 
       and, if an allegation regarding the statement or 
       omission is made on information and belief, the 
       complaint shall state with particularity all facts on 
       which that belief is formed. 
 
15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-4(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999). 4 Regarding 




2. See Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and 
Legislative Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class 
Action, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1003, 1025 n.124 & accompanying text (1998) 
(citing and discussing cases). 
 
3. See Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 
4. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 743, 758. 
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        In any private action arising under this chapter in 
       which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on 
       proof that the defendant acted with a particular state 
       of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act 
       or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with 
       particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that 
       the defendant acted with the required state of mind. 
 
Id. S 78u-4(b)(2). Failure to meet these requirements will 
result in dismissal of the complaint. See id. S 78u-4(b)(3)(A). 
Complaints alleging securities fraud must also comply with 
Rule 9(b), which provides: "In all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, 
and other condition of mind of a person may be averred 
generally." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).5 
 
Although the Reform Act's "strong inference" language 
mirrors the Second Circuit's, the precise extent to which 
Congress intended to adopt the Second Circuit standard is 
not clear. The Reform Act's legislative history on this point 
is ambiguous and even contradictory. The purpose of the 
Act was to restrict abuses in securities class-action 
litigation, including: (1) the practice of filing lawsuits 
against issuers of securities in response to any significant 
change in stock price, regardless of defendants' culpability; 
(2) the targeting of "deep pocket" defendants; (3) the abuse 
of the discovery process to coerce settlement; and (4) 
manipulation of clients by class action attorneys. See H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 28 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 748. 
 
The bill originally proposed in the House of 
Representatives would have altered both the procedural 
and the substantive requirements governing claims under 
Rule 10b-5. Procedurally, House Bill 10 provided that a 
complaint alleging securities fraud must plead "specific 
facts" demonstrating that the defendant acted with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Rule 9(b)'s provision allowing state of mind to be averred generally 
conflicts with the Reform Act's requirement that plaintiffs "state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference" of scienter. 15 
U.S.C.A. S 78u-4(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999). In that sense, we believe the 
Reform Act supersedes Rule 9(b) as it relates to Rule 10b-5 actions. 
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requisite scienter. H.R. 10, 104th Cong. S 204 (1995). 
Substantively, the bill would have eliminated recklessness 
as a basis for satisfying the scienter element in securities 
fraud liability. See id. After hearings in the House 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, 
however, House Bill 10 was revised to reinstate and define 
recklessness as a basis for liability.6  The revised bill, 
designated House Bill 1058, also contained a seemingly 
more stringent pleading standard: It required the complaint 
to "make specific allegations which, if true, would be 
sufficient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the 
time the alleged violation occurred." H.R. 1058, 104th 
Cong. S 4 (1995). Rejecting a proposed amendment that 
would have weakened the pleading requirement, the House 
retained this language in the final version of the bill, which 
was passed in March 1995. 
 
Soon thereafter, the Senate passed its own version of the 
Reform Act. The Senate bill required plaintiffs to allege 
"specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of each 
defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred." S. 
240, 104th Cong. S 104 (1995). In its report of the bill to 
the full Senate, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs described its pleading standard as 
follows: 
 
       The Committee does not adopt a new and untested 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The definition of recklessness was the subject of considerable debate 
on the House floor. Ultimately, House Bill 1058 defined recklessness as 
follows: 
 
        (4) Recklessness.--For purposes of paragraph (1), a defendant 
       makes a fraudulent statement recklessly if the defendant, in making 
       such statement, is guilty of highly unreasonable conduct that (A) 
       involves not merely simple or even gross negligence, but an extreme 
       departure from standards of ordinary care, and (B) presents a 
       danger of misleading buyers or sellers that was either known to the 
       defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been 
       consciously aware of it. Deliberately refraining from taking steps 
to 
       discover whether one's statements are false or misleading 
       constitutes recklessness, but if the failure to investigate was not 
       deliberate, such conduct shall not be considered reckless. 
 
141 Cong. Rec. H2863-64 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995). 
 
                                9 
  
       pleading standard that would generate additional 
       litigation. Instead, the Committee chose a uniform 
       standard modeled upon the pleading standard of the 
       Second Circuit. Regarded as the most stringent 
       pleading standard, the Second Circuit requires that the 
       plaintiff plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference" 
       of defendant's fraudulent intent. The Committee does 
       not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law 
       interpreting this pleading standard, although courts 
       may find this body of law instructive. 
 
S. Rep. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 15 (1995). During 
the subsequent floor debate, the Senate considered an 
amendment closely tracking the language of the Second 
Circuit pleading standard and case law. The amendment, 
proposed by Senator Specter, provided: 
 
        For purposes of paragraph (1), a strong inference 
       that the defendant acted with the required state of 
       mind may be established either-- 
 
        (A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had 
       both motive and opportunity to commit fraud; or 
 
        (B) by alleging facts that constitute strong 
       circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or 
       recklessness by the defendant. 
 
141 Cong. Rec. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995). Senator 
Specter expressly noted that his amendment was based on 
Second Circuit case law, particularly Beck v. Manufacturers 
Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987). See id. at 
S9171 (statement of Sen. Specter). He further stated: "This 
is just basic fundamental fairness that if you take the 
Second Circuit standard, you ought to take the entire 
standard . . . ." 141 Cong. Rec. S9200 (daily ed. June 28, 
1995) (statement of Sen. Specter). The Specter amendment 
was passed by a vote of 57 to 42, see id. at S9201, and 
Senate Bill 240 was passed on June 28, 1995, see id. at 
S9219. 
 
The differences between the House and Senate versions 
of the Reform Act were addressed by a Committee of 
Conference, which released its report on November 28, 
1995. The accompanying "Statement of Managers" recited 
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that the purpose of the Reform Act was to create uniformity 
among the circuits and "establish . . . more stringent 
pleading requirements to curtail the filing of meritless 
lawsuits." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995). It 
further stated: 
 
       Heightened pleading standard 
 
       . . . 
 
        The Conference Committee language is based in part 
       on the pleading standard of the Second Circuit. The 
       standard also is specifically written to conform the 
       language to Rule 9(b)'s notion of pleading "with 
       particularity." 
 
        Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, 
       the Second Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff 
       state facts with particularity, and that these facts, in 
       turn, must give rise to a "strong inference" of the 
       defendant's fraudulent intent. Because the Conference 
       Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading 
       requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second 
       Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard. 
 
Id. The accompanying footnote stated: "For this reason, the 
Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading 
standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, 
or recklessness," an apparent reference to Second Circuit 
case law interpreting the pleading requirements for 
scienter. Id. n.23; cf. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269 (holding 
that a plaintiff must allege either "facts establishing a 
motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do so" or 
"facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless 
or conscious behavior"). 
 
President Clinton vetoed the Reform Act on the grounds 
that it imposed excessively stringent pleading requirements: 
 
       I believe that the pleading requirements of the 
       Conference Report with regard to a defendant's state of 
       mind impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to 
       meritorious claims being heard in Federal courts. I am 
       prepared to support the high pleading standards of the 
       U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit -- the 
       highest pleading standard of any Federal circuit court. 
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       But the conferees make crystal clear in the Statement 
       of Managers their intent to raise the standard even 
       beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept that. 
 
141 Cong. Rec. H15214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (veto 
message of President Clinton). Subsequently, both houses 
of Congress overrode the President's veto and the Reform 
Act was enacted into law without changes to the pleading 
standard. 
 
Complicating matters further, Congress recently enacted 
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-353 ("the Standards Act"). Though the 
Standards Act does not modify or amend the text of the 
Reform Act, its Conference Report states: "It is the clear 
understanding of the managers that Congress did not, in 
adopting the Reform Act, intend to alter the standards of 
liability under the Exchange Act." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105- 
803, at 13 (1998); see also S. Rep. No. 182, at 11 (1998) 
("The managers understand . . . that certain Federal district 
courts have interpreted the Reform Act as having altered 
the scienter requirement. In that regard, the managers 
again emphasize that the clear intent in 1995 and our 
continuing intent in this legislation is that neither the 
Reform Act nor [the Standards Act] in any way alters the 
scienter standard in Federal securities fraud suits."). The 
Senate Report reiterates that the Reform Act "establishes a 
heightened uniform Federal standard on pleading 
requirements based upon the pleading standard applied by 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals." Id. Despite these 
statements, however, we do not believe the Standards Act 
resolved the uncertainty. In both the House and Senate 
floor debate on the Standards Act, legislators continued to 
disagree whether the Reform Act codified the Second 
Circuit standard.7 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Federal Securities Law Reports observe: 
 
       Responding to confusion over the pleading standard imposed by the 
       Reform Act, proponents of the Uniform Standards Act took the 
       opportunity to restate and clarify what Congress intended in 1995. 
       The Managers' Statement on the Uniform Standards Act. . . 
       explained that the 1995 Act did not alter the standards of 
liability 
       under the Exchange Act but that it did establish a heightened, 
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instructed that "the interpretation given by one Congress 
(or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is 
of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that 
statute." Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994). Consequently, our 
interpretation of the Reform Act is unaffected by the 
legislative history of the Standards Act. 
 
Ultimately, we believe there is little to gain in attempting 
to reconcile the conflicting expressions of legislative intent, 
including the President's veto statement. The legislative 
history on this point is contradictory and inconclusive, and 
we are reluctant to accord it much weight. Accordingly, we 
direct our attention to the Reform Act's plain language, 
which is the customary starting point in statutory 
interpretation. The text of section 21D(b)(2) closely mirrors 
language employed by the Second Circuit, particularly as it 
requires the plaintiff to allege facts supporting a"strong 
inference" of scienter. In fact, with the exception of the Act's 
"state with particularity" requirement, the two standards 
are virtually identical. Cf. 15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-4(b)(2) (plaintiff 
must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state 
of mind"); Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 53 (2d 
Cir. 1995) ("Plaintiffs must also allege facts that give rise to 
a strong inference of scienter."). We believe Congress's use 
of the Second Circuit's language compels the conclusion 
that the Reform Act establishes a pleading standard 
approximately equal in stringency to that of the Second 
Circuit. Because the Second Circuit standard was regarded 
as the most restrictive prior the Reform Act, this 
interpretation is consistent with Congress's stated intent of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       uniform federal standard for pleading scienter based on the 2nd 
       U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals standard. The debates over the 
earlier 
       House and Senate bills largely echoed this view and included 
       remarks that the Reform Act specifically adopted the 2nd Circuit 
       standard. Other remarks, however, suggested that Congress 
       intended a pleading standard higher than the 2nd Circuit's. Thus, 
       despite Congress' efforts to clarify its intent, some uncertainty 
may 
       still persist. 
 
1844 Federal Sec. L. Rep. 2 (Nov. 11, 1998). 
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strengthening pleading requirements and deterring frivolous 
securities litigation. In many jurisdictions, adoption of a 
"strong inference" standard will substantially heighten the 
barriers to pleading scienter, a result Congress expressly 
intended. Moreover, even in jurisdictions already employing 
the Second Circuit standard, the additional requirement 
that plaintiffs state facts "with particularity" represents a 
heightening of the standard. This language echoes precisely 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and therefore requires plaintiffs to plead 
"the who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph 
of any newspaper story." DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 
624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoted in Burlington Coat Factory, 
114 F.3d at 1422). 
 
Although the Reform Act established a uniform pleading 
standard, it did not purport to alter the substantive 
contours of scienter. Under the heading "Requirements for 
securities fraud actions," the Act expressly characterizes 
subsections 21D(b)(1) and (b)(2) as imposing "pleading 
requirements." 15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 
1999). On this point, the legislative history is 
uncontradicted and reinforces the view that these 
provisions impose strictly procedural requirements. The 
Statement of Managers notes "this legislation implements 
needed procedural protections to discourage frivolous 
litigation," an explicit reference to the procedural nature of 
the Reform Act. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369 at 28 (1995). 
It also states that section 21D(b)(2) imposes a"heightened 
pleading standard" in response to disparate interpretations 
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), a procedural rule. See id. at 37 
("[Rule 9(b)] has not prevented abuse of the securities laws 
by private litigants. Moreover, the courts of appeals have 
interpreted Rule 9(b)'s requirement in conflicting ways, 
creating distinctly different standards among the circuits."). 
Likewise, the floor debate and committee reports in both 
houses of Congress, as well as the President's veto 
statement, all describe the Reform Act as imposing new 
"pleading requirements." In view of the statutory language 
and supporting legislative history, we believe section 
21D(b)(2) was intended to modify procedural requirements 
while leaving substantive law undisturbed.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. As noted, the Silicon Graphics court interpreted the Reform Act to 
eliminate allegations of motive, opportunity, and non-deliberate 
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Accordingly, we hold that it remains sufficient for 
plaintiffs plead scienter by alleging facts "establishing a 
motive and an opportunity to commit fraud, or by setting 
forth facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of either 
reckless or conscious behavior." Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 
129 F.3d 310, 318 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997); accord Press, 166 
F.3d at 538 (same). Motive and opportunity, like all other 
allegations of scienter (intentional, conscious, or reckless 
behavior), must now be supported by facts stated "with 
particularity" and must give rise to a "strong inference" of 
scienter. 15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-4(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999). 
These heightened pleading requirements address the 
previous ease of alleging motive and opportunity on the 
part of corporate officers to commit securities fraud. 
Permitting blanket assertions of motive and opportunity to 
serve as a basis for liability under the Exchange Act would 
undermine the more rigorous pleading standard Congress 
has established. After the Reform Act, catch-all allegations 
that defendants stood to benefit from wrongdoing and had 
the opportunity to implement a fraudulent scheme are no 
longer sufficient, because they do not state facts with 
particularity or give rise to a strong inference of scienter. 
 
As for recklessness, we reiterate our previous holding 
that it remains a sufficient basis for liability. See Burlington 
Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1418. Retaining recklessness not 
only is consistent with the Reform Act's expressly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
recklessness as independent bases for scienter. See 746 F. Supp. at 757 
("Motive, opportunity, and non-deliberate recklessness may provide some 
evidence of intentional wrongdoing, but are not alone sufficient to 
support scienter unless the totality of the evidence creates a strong 
inference of fraud."). The court relied largely on the Act's legislative 
history, particularly the Conference Committee's deletion of the Specter 
amendment. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, at 41 n.23 ("For this reason, the Conference Report 
chose not to include in the pleading standard certain language relating 
to motive, opportunity, or recklessness."). But if Congress had desired to 
eliminate motive and opportunity or recklessness as a basis for scienter, 
it could have done so expressly in the text of the Reform Act. In our 
view, the fact that Congress considered inserting language directly 
addressing this line of cases, but ultimately chose not to, suggests that 
it intended to leave the matter to judicial interpretation. 
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procedural language, but also promotes the policy 
objectives of discouraging deliberate ignorance and 
preventing defendants from escaping liability solely because 
of the difficulty of proving conscious intent to commit 
fraud. A reckless statement is one " `involving not merely 
simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme 
departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which 
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is 
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the 
actor must have been aware of it.' " McLean v. Alexander, 
599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Sunstrand 
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 
1977)). We also note that scienter may be alleged by stating 
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of 
conscious wrongdoing, such as intentional fraud or other 
deliberate illegal behavior. 
 
We now turn to the particulars of plaintiffs' complaint. 
 
B. The Point Statement 
 
Plaintiffs contend the Point statement subjects Advanta 
to liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which 
makes it unlawful for any person to "use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security, . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe." 15 U.S.C.A. S 78j(b) (West 
Supp. 1999). Rule 10b-5, in turn, makes it unlawful to 
"make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. 
S 240.10b-5(b) (1998). These provisions create a private 
right of action for plaintiffs to recover damages for "false or 
misleading statements or omissions of material fact that 
affect trading on the secondary market." Burlington Coat 
Factory, 114 F.3d at 1417; see also In re Craftmatic Sec. 
Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 639 (3d Cir. 1989) (federal securities 
law recognizes a right of action for omitting material facts 
that would assume significance in the deliberations of a 
reasonable shareholder). 
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The Reform Act establishes a safe harbor protecting 
certain "forward-looking" statements from Rule 10b-5 
liability. See 15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-5 (West Supp. 1999). 
Regarding statements made by natural persons (as opposed 
to business entities), the Act provides that a forward- 
looking statement is shielded by the safe-harbor provision 
unless the plaintiff proves it was made with "actual 
knowledge . . . that the statement was false or misleading." 
Id. S 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i). The District Court held the Point 
statement was forward-looking and qualified for protection 
under the Act because "[p]laintiffs' catch-all allegation that 
all speakers knew their statements were false when made is 
too broad and Alter's comments indicate nothing more than 
Advanta's failure to follow through exactly as planned on its 
proposed interest increase, rather than purposeful intent to 
fool the public." Advanta, mem. op. at 23. The Advanta 
shareholders contend that the Point statement was not 
forward-looking, and that even if it was, it was made with 
actual knowledge of its false and misleading nature and 
therefore does not qualify for protection. 
 
Under the Reform Act, a statement is forward-looking if, 
inter alia, it is "a statement containing a projection of 
revenues, income (including income loss), earnings 
(including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, 
dividends, capital structure, or other financial items." 15 
U.S.C.A. S 78u-5(i)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1999). The first portion 
of the Point statement reads, "Over the next six months 
Advanta will experience a large increase in revenues. . . ." 
In our view, this portion of the statement clearly qualifies 
as "a projection of revenues" and therefore is forward- 
looking. The remaining portion of the statement,"as 
[Advanta] converts more than $5 billion in accounts that 
are now at teaser rates of about 7% to its normal interest 
rate of about 17%," is a statement of Advanta's plan to 
reprice its teaser-rate accounts to a rate of about 17%. We 
believe this part of the statement is forward-looking as well, 
because it is "a statement of the plans and objectives of 
management for future operations, including plans or 
objectives relating to the products or services of the issuer." 
Id. S 78u-5(i)(1)(B). Consequently, we hold that the entire 
Point statement is "forward-looking" within the meaning of 
the Act. 
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Nonetheless, the safe harbor will not apply if the 
statement was made with "actual knowledge" that the 
statement was false or misleading. Id. S 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i). 
Plaintiffs argue the falsity of the Point statement is proved 
by Dennis Alter's subsequent comment that "we were 
probably not as aggressive as we could have been[repricing 
our rates] . . . . Instead of repricing to 18 percent we 
repriced closer to 13 or 14 percent in order to retain our 
image and the luster of being a low-cost provider." Because 
Point was Advanta's spokesperson, plaintiffs argue, she 
must have possessed actual knowledge that Advanta was 
not repricing to 17 percent, but only 13 or 14 percent, at 
the time the statement was made. Plaintiffs further contend 
that even if Point did not possess actual knowledge, the 
failure of Advanta's executives to repudiate the statement 
constituted a ratification of it. 
 
The complaint does not plead any specific facts to 
support an inference that Point, or anyone else at Advanta, 
had actual knowledge of her statement's falsity. The 
complaint's only specific factual allegation regarding the 
falsity of the Point statement is the existence of the Alter 
statement some nine months later. But the Point statement 
and the Alter statement are not inconsistent: Point stated 
in September 1996 that Advanta planned to reprice its 
teaser rates to 17%; nine months later, Alter expressed 
regret that Advanta did not reprice to that level. Even 
assuming the two statements referred to precisely the same 
accounts, it does not follow that Point's statement was 
false: Advanta may have intended to reprice the accounts to 
17 percent at the time of the Point statement and 
subsequently changed its business strategy. As the 
defendants point out, Advanta owed no duty to update the 
Point statement. See 15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-5(d) (West Supp. 
1999) ("Nothing in this section shall impose upon any 
person a duty to update a forward-looking statement."); 
Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1433 ("[T]he voluntary 
disclosure of an ordinary earnings forecast does not trigger 
any duty to update.).9 At best, comparison of the Point and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We also reject plaintiffs' argument that the Alter statement, along 
with 
proposed corrective measures announced by Advanta in the wake of the 
$20 million loss, constitute "admissions" of securities fraud liability. 
If 
this were so, all companies that suffer losses and then publicly discuss 
how they plan to improve earnings in the future would be guilty of 
admissions that they defrauded investors. 
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Alter statements suggests that Advanta made a series of 
unwise business decisions in its attempt to attract new 
customers. But section 10(b) does not " `regulate 
transactions which constitute no more than internal 
corporate mismanagement.' " Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 
430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. 
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)). 
 
Plaintiffs' complaint fails to plead any other facts 
supporting an inference that the Point statement was made 
with "actual knowledge" of its falsity. Accordingly, we 
believe the statement was protected by the safe-harbor 
provision for forward-looking statements. 
 
C. The "Positive Portrayals" 
 
Next, we consider whether plaintiffs adequately pleaded a 
cause of action relating to the "positive portrayals" made by 
Advanta and its officers. To state a securities fraud claim 
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, a private plaintiff must 
plead the following elements: "(1) that the defendant made 
a misrepresentation or omission of (2) a material (3) fact; (4) 
that the defendant acted with knowledge or recklessness 
and (5) that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the 
misrepresentation or omission and (6) consequently 
suffered damage." In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 
696, 710 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Plaintiffs' amended complaint identifies a number of 
representations alleged to satisfy these criteria. In addition 
to those set forth above (upon which the District Court 
focused its analysis), the complaint identifies the following 
statements: 
 
(1) An April 1996 letter to shareholders, signed by 
defendants Hart, Alter, Greenawalt and Rosoff, stated: 
 
       Advanta's credit quality continues to be among the best 
       in the industry. Our emphasis on gold cards -- and 
       targeting of high quality customer prospects with great 
       potential for profitability -- sets us apart from other 
       credit card issuers. 
 
       * * * 
 
       The Company is among the most efficient producers in 
       the credit card industry. Our superior cost structure 
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       for delivering and servicing financial products allows us 
       to achieve outstanding returns with highly competitive 
       pricing and flexibility. 
 
(Pls.' Am. Compl. P 35.) The letter also touted Advanta's 
strengths, including "an experienced management team, 
technological expertise . . . and expanding distribution 
channels." (Id.) 
 
(2) Advanta's 1995 Annual Report included the following 
representations regarding the quality of its credit portfolio: 
 
       While we added substantially to our account base, our 
       credit quality remained excellent. 
 
       * * * 
 
       Our emphasis on gold cards -- and targeting of better 
       quality customers -- helps us maintain an enviable 
       credit quality profile. Gold cards made up 82% of our 
       credit card balances in 1995, nearly double the 
       industry average. 
 
(Id. P 36.) The 1995 Annual Report also referred to 
Advanta's "risk-adjusted pricing strategy" in which "credit 
cards are issued with lower rates to customers whose credit 
quality is expected to result in a lower rate of credit losses." 
(Id.) 
 
(3) A July 18, 1996 letter to shareholders, again signed 
by defendants Alter, Hart, Greenawalt and Rosoff, stated 
that "[d]espite industry-wide pressure on credit card asset 
quality, Advanta continued to produce better-than-industry 
credit measures, and achieved excellent growth and returns 
throughout our core businesses." (Id.P 37.) 
 
(4) A Form 8-K filed with the SEC on October 17, 1996 
and signed by defendant Schneyer stated, "The Company's 
credit card asset quality statistics continue to be better 
than industry averages." (Id. P 50.) 
 
According to plaintiffs, these statements (as well as those 
set forth supra, Part I) were materially false and misleading 
because they failed to disclose the deterioration in credit 
quality allegedly caused by Advanta's aggressive efforts to 
attract new customers. The District Court held the 
statements do not prove Advanta intentionally misled or 
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defrauded investors, but only that profits failed to live up to 
expectations. See Advanta, mem. op. at 19. Consequently, 
the court rejected plaintiffs' arguments as "attempts to 
plead fraud by hindsight." Id. 
 
Rule 10b-5 liability does not attach merely because "[a]t 
one time the firm bathes itself in a favorable light" but 
"[l]ater the firm discloses that things are less rosy." DiLeo, 
901 F.2d at 627. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the loss was attributable to the defendant's fraudulent 
conduct. As noted, the Reform Act requires plaintiffs to 
"specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, 
the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, 
and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is 
made on information and belief, the complaint shall state 
with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." 
15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-4(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999). Furthermore, 
the complaint must "state with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
required state of mind." Id. S 78u-4(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999). 
 
The complaint here alleges that during the time period in 
which Advanta issued the positive portrayals, the company 
implemented policies relaxing its underwriting and 
monitoring procedures and "superior credit risk customers 
were switching to other credit card companies at rates that 
would have a materially negative impact on the Company's 
reported earnings." (Pls. Am. Compl. P 46.) Elsewhere, it 
alleges that Advanta changed its methodology for 
computing bankruptcy charge-offs without promptly 
disclosing this change to the marketplace, see id. PP 46, 48, 
50; that Advanta repriced its teaser rates to 13 or 14 
percent rather than its normal rate of 17 percent, causing 
a substantial decline in revenues, id. P 47; and that 
Advanta lacked adequate collection capability to support 
the expansion in its customer base, id.P 52. According to 
plaintiffs, the juxtaposition of these alleged facts against 
the positive portrayals shows that the statements were 
materially misleading when made. 
 
We disagree. Even assuming plaintiffs' allegations are 
true, the positive portrayals do not contradict any of 
defendants' other statements but merely report previous 
successes and express confidence in Advanta's prospects 
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for future growth. Factual recitations of past earnings, so 
long as they are accurate, do not create liability under 
Section 10(b). See Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 
24 F.3d 357, 361 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[D]efendants may not be 
held liable under the securities laws for accurate reports of 
past successes, even if present circumstances are less 
rosy.") Similarly, vague and general statements of optimism 
"constitute no more than `puffery' and are understood by 
reasonable investors as such." Burlington Coat Factory, 114 
F.3d at 1428 n.14; see also San Leandro Emergency Med. 
Plan v. Phillip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 283 n.12. Such statements, even if 
arguably misleading, do not give rise to a federal securities 
claim because they are not material: there is no 
"substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted 
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the `total mix' of information 
made available." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 
U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 642 
(holding that "statements of subjective analysis or 
extrapolation, such as opinions, motives, and intentions" 
are "soft information" and hence immaterial for purposes of 
Rule 10b-5). The representations identified by plaintiffs fall 
entirely into these categories: accurate reports of past 
earnings, and non-actionable expressions of optimism for 
the future. We are skeptical that plaintiffs or any other 
reasonable investors would make investment decisions 
based on the positive portrayals. 
 
Even if the positive portrayals were materially misleading, 
we believe the complaint suffers a more fundamental defect 
in that it fails to satisfy the Reform Act's requirements for 
pleading scienter. Rather than state with particularity facts 
supporting a strong inference that defendants possessed 
the requisite scienter, plaintiffs offer conclusory assertions 
that the defendants acted "knowingly," Pls. Am. Compl. 
PP 22, 42, 51, as well as blanket statements that 
defendants must have been aware of the impending losses 
by virtue of their positions within the company, see id. 
PP 19, 22, 23. It is well established that a pleading of 
scienter "may not rest on a bare inference that a defendant 
`must have had' knowledge of the facts." Greenstone v. 
Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer, J.) 
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(quoting Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 
F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir.1986)). Likewise, allegations that a 
securities-fraud defendant, because of his position within 
the company, "must have known" a statement was false or 
misleading are "precisely the types of inferences which 
[courts], on numerous occasions, have determined to be 
inadequate to withstand Rule 9(b) scrutiny." Maldonado v. 
Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1998). Generalized 
imputations of knowledge do not suffice, regardless of the 
defendants' positions within the company. See Rosenbloom 
v. Adams, Scott & Conway, Inc., 552 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 
(7th Cir. 1977) ("A director, officer, or even the president of 
a corporation often has superior knowledge and 
information, but neither the knowledge nor the information 
necessarily attaches to those positions."). In re Ancor 
Communications, Inc. Sec. Litig., 22 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D. 
Minn. 1998), relied upon by plaintiffs, does not suggest 
otherwise. There the court inferred that key officers were 
aware their product would likely prove incompatible with 
the products of another company with whom Ancor had 
entered into a supply contract. The court expressly based 
its holding on the facts that the contract "was undeniably 
the most significant contract in Ancor's history," thus 
supporting an unusually strong inference of scienter, and 
that plaintiffs' complaint also cited extrinsic evidence such 
as discussions among officers regarding product 
incompatibility and an escape clause in the supply 
agreement governing this contingency. Id. at 1005. Such 
considerations are not present here. 
 
Plaintiffs also argue that even if defendants did not 
intentionally mislead investors, they recklessly disregarded 
negative trends in the credit card industry and in Advanta's 
customer base, and therefore possessed the requisite 
scienter. In particular, plaintiffs contend the positive 
portrayals were reckless in light of industry-wide increases 
in personal bankruptcies and charge-offs, especially as 
exacerbated by Advanta's alleged decisions to reprice 
introductory rates to only 13 or 14 percent and to relax 
underwriting and monitoring practices. We disagree. For 
purposes of the scienter requirement of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, we have adopted Sunstrand's definition of a 
reckless statement as one " `involving not merely simple, or 
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even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure 
from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a 
danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known 
to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have 
been aware of it.' " McLean, 599 F.2d at 1197 (quoting 
Sunstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045); accord In re Phillips 
Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989). 
Plaintiffs' allegations, even if true, would not demonstrate 
an "extreme departure" from the standards of ordinary 
care. At most, the complaint demonstrates that Advanta 
embarked on a business strategy of aggressively recruiting 
new customers without adequately accounting for the 
increased risk this endeavor posed. None of the facts in the 
complaint suggests this strategy represented an egregious 
departure from the range of reasonable business decisions, 
as opposed to simple mismanagement. But "claims 
essentially grounded on corporate mismanagement are not 
cognizable under federal law." Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 638- 
39. Accordingly, we find that the positive portrayals do not 
support a strong inference of recklessness. 
 
The complaint's remaining allegation regarding scienter is 
that several of the individual defendants -- most 
prominently, Richard Greenawalt, Dennis Alter, Robert 
Marshall, and Gene Schneyer -- sold large blocks of their 
Advanta stock during November and December 1996, 
approximately three months before the $20 million loss was 
announced to the marketplace. (See Pls. Am. Compl. P 69.) 
Plaintiffs allege these transactions suggest defendants knew 
of the impending first-quarter loss or at least had the 
motive and opportunity to commit fraud. The complaint 
sets forth the dates, numbers of shares, and proceeds of 
the sales. (See id.) 
 
We have held that "[w]e will not infer fraudulent intent 
from the mere fact that some officers sold stock." Burlington 
Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1424; accord San Leandro, 75 
F.3d at 814 ("[T]he sale of stock by one company executive 
does not give rise to a strong inference of the company's 
fraudulent intent . . . ."); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 
F.3d 1194, 1224 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[T]he mere fact that 
insider stock sales occurred does not suffice to establish 
scienter."). But if the stock sales were unusual in scope or 
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timing, they may support an inference of scienter. See 
Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1424; Shaw, 82 F.3d 
at 1224 ("[A]llegations of `insider trading in suspicious 
amounts or at suspicious times' may permit an inference 
that the trader -- and by further inference, the company -- 
possessed material nonpublic information at the time.") 
(quoting Greenstone, 975 F.2d at 26). In Burlington Coat 
Factory, we found the stock sales did not permit an 
inference of scienter because only three of thefive 
defendants sold stock, plaintiffs provided information on 
the total stock holdings of only one defendant who had 
traded only 0.5 percent of his holdings, and plaintiffs failed 
to plead facts indicating whether such trades were"normal 
and routine" for the defendants and whether the trading 
profits were substantial in comparison to their overall 
compensation. See 114 F.3d at 1423. 
 
Here, three of the individual defendants sold no stock at 
all during the class period, raising doubt whether the sales 
were motivated by an intent to profit from inflated stock 
prices before the upcoming losses were reported. See Acito, 
47 F.3d at 54 (holding that lack of sales by several 
defendants "undermines plaintiffs' claim that defendants 
delayed notifying the public so that they could sell their 
stock at a huge profit") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In addition, although the complaint fails to provide 
information on the percentage of total holdings sold by the 
defendants, it appears the defendants who did trade stock 
during the class period sold only small percentages of their 
holdings. According to Form 4s that were filed with the SEC 
and attached to Advanta's motion to dismiss, Schneyer and 
Alter sold only 7 percent and 5 percent, respectively, of 
their total holdings.10 Alter, in particular, continued to hold 
a sizable percentage of Advanta's outstanding stock even 
after the 1996 sales. Far from supporting a "strong 
inference" that defendants had a motive to capitalize on 
artificially inflated stock prices, these facts suggest they 
had every incentive to keep Advanta profitable. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Although similar information is not available with regard to the other 
individual defendants, Advanta has no duty to provide it; rather, the 
burden is on the plaintiffs to plead facts supporting an inference of 
scienter. 
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Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1422 n.12 (finding no 
motive and opportunity because plaintiffs failed to explain 
"how a temporary inflation of . . . stock price would help 
management increase its compensation or preserve its 
jobs"); Wallace v. Systems & Computer Tech. Corp., No. 95- 
CV-6303, 1997 WL 602808, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 
1997) (same). 
 
Nor were the sales at issue particularly large in 
comparison to the individual defendants' previous trading 
practices. The complaint alleges that Greenawalt, Alter, 
Marshall, and Schneyer sold a total of 1,023,766 shares 
during the eight-month class period, as compared to 
580,814 during the previous 28 months. It makes no 
reference to the previous trading practices of the other 
individual defendants. Although the profits realized by the 
defendants were significant relative to their base salaries, 
these proceeds were the result of accumulated stock 
options and were an intended part of their overall 
compensation package. (See Pls. Am. Compl.PP 11-16.) As 
we recognized in Burlington Coat Factory, "[a] large number 
of today's corporate executives are compensated in terms of 
stock and stock options. It follows then that these 
individuals will trade those securities in the normal course 
of events." 114 F.3d at 1424 (citation omitted). 
 
Thus, we hold that the allegations concerning defendants' 
stock transactions do not permit a strong inference of 
scienter, as required by the Reform Act.11  Nor have 
plaintiffs alleged other specific facts supporting such an 
inference. Consequently, we believe the claims relating to 
positive portrayals fail to comply with statutory pleading 
requirements and were correctly dismissed. 
 
D. Contemporaneous Trading 
 
One of the individual plaintiffs, Jerry Weinberg, alleges 
that two of the individual defendants, Greenawalt and 
Marshall, traded large blocks of Advanta stock 
contemporaneously with Weinberg while in possession of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Because the complaint fails to meet the pleading requirements of the 
Reform Act, we need not address whether it also fails to meet the 
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
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material, nonpublic information, violating section 20(A) of 
the Exchange Act. According to the complaint, Greenawalt 
sold Class A and B stock on December 6, 1996; Marshall 
sold Class A and B stock on December 9, 1996; and 
Weinberg purchased Class A stock on December 9, 1996. 
 
Section 20(A) of the Exchange Act provides that an 
insider who trades stock "while in possession of material, 
nonpublic information" is liable to any person who traded 
contemporaneously with the insider. 15 U.S.C.A.S 78t-1(a) 
(West Supp. 1999). Liability under section 20(A) is 
predicated upon an independent violation of "this chapter 
or the rules or regulations thereunder." Id. Hence, claims 
under section 20(A) are derivative, requiring proof of a 
separate underlying violation of the Exchange Act. See 
Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 32 F.3d 
697, 703 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[T]o state a claim under S 20A, a 
plaintiff must plead a predicate violation of the '34 Act or 
its rules and regulations."); In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 11 
F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that if plaintiffs "have 
failed to allege an actionable independent underlying 
violation of the '34 Act, they similarly cannot maintain a 
claim under S 20A"). Because plaintiffs have failed to plead 
a predicate violation of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the 




The District Court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claim 
based upon the Point statement because the statement was 
protected by the Reform Act's safe-harbor provision. The 
remaining claims in Count I failed to comply with the 
pleading requirements of the Reform Act, and the section 
20(A) claim is derivative of Count I. Accordingly, these 
claims were properly dismissed as well. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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